I Introduction
One of the virtues of so-called 'nativist' theories of language acquisition (first and second) is their ability to provoke opposition: the very idea of an innate Universal Grammar (UG) has from the beginning been unacceptable to many serious scholars, who have endeavoured to show that language acquisition can be explained without appeal to an innate system of grammatical categories and principles (e.g., Lieberman, 1984; O'Grady, 1987; Deane, 1992; Deacon, 1997; Sampson, 1997; 2001) . In recent years a number of researchers have been advocating what has come to be called an 'emergentist' position on language acquisition (see, for example, articles in MacWhinney, 1999; O'Grady, 1999 O'Grady, , 2001 , in press), essentially the claim that, in Ellis's words, 'the complexity of language emerges from relatively simple developmental processes being exposed to a massive and complex environment' (Ellis, in press: 9) .
Emergentists are a fairly heterogeneous group, although having in common a rejection of anything like a 'Chomskian' UG, but one can distinguish two subsets: 'nativist' emergentists -mainly O'Grady and his associates -and what I call 'empiricist' emergentists, a term that I think accurately includes all other selfproclaimed emergentists. In second language acquisition (SLA) specifically, empiricist emergentism has been forcefully and articulately advocated in a series of articles by Nick Ellis (e.g., Ellis; 2002a; 2002b; 2003) . Both O'Gradian nativist emergentism and empiricist emergentism, of course, stand in explicit opposition to nativist accounts of language that appeal to something like UG. This latter form of nativism is sometimes referred to as 'special nativism' -to distinguish it from O'Grady's 'general' or 'cognitive' nativism -but I am going to borrow a term from Fodor (1984) and speak of 'mad dog nativism'. What I propose to do here is to look at empiricist emergentism as a theoretical stance, to examine emergentist critiques of mad dog nativism, and to consider some of the explanatory problems confronting an emergentist account of SLA. O'Grady's proposals, by virtue of the nativist assumptions they include, are sufficiently different from the more 'mainstream', empiricist kind of emergentism as to preclude discussing them here, although they definitely merit close analysis. In what follows, then, I use the term 'emergentist' as shorthand for 'empiricist emergentist', excluding, with some reluctance, any consideration of O'Grady-style nativist emergentism.
II Theories of cognitive capacities
To start with, recall the distinction made by Cummins (1983) between property theories and transition theories. In cognitive sciences like linguistics and language acquisition, the property theory asks, 'What is the nature of a given cognitive faculty? ' ' In what does visual cognition consist, or face recognition, or linguistic competence?' The transition theory asks, 'Whatever it consists in, how do we acquire that faculty?' In SLA, then, the basic questions would be something like, 'In what does the capacity to use an L2 consist?' and 'How does one acquire that capacity?' These questions are similar to the first two of Chomsky's big three -'What is knowledge of language?' 'How is this knowledge acquired?' -except that the term 'knowledge' is, of course, highly tendentious.
Indeed, one of the fundamental property-theoretic questions that divide various theories of language and language acquisition is precisely whether such terms as 'knowledge' are appropriate. That is, there is a question whether or not one must appeal to 'representations' in one's explanation of language competence and language acquisition; whether or not, in Fiona Cowie's formulation of the 'representationalist' claim, 'Explaining language mastery and acquisition requires the postulation of contentful mental states and processes involving their manipulations' (Cowie, 1999: 176) . Such a formulation may at first seem almost truistic; but keep in mind that 'contentful mental states' can be one way of saying 'symbols', and that 'processes involving their manipulations' is a way of saying 'computations'. Given the number of people in our field who are likely to cringe at the word 'computation', the claim of representationalism is hardly innocent. More to the point, there are at least two well established groups who would reject the claim: behaviourists, for whom appeal to contentful mental states is of course anathema, and eliminativists, for whom the proper level of explanation of cognitive faculties is the neural level, and for whom talk of representations is otiose at best. Both nativism and emergentism are representationalist doctrines. They disagree as to the nature and ontogeny of the representations -for instance, as to whether they are properly conceived of as symbols -but they agree that explaining linguistic capacities requires appealing to representations of some sort.
A second issue distinguishing among various possible property theories is that of modularity. Here, some care is necessary. Cognitive science recognizes a couple of different senses of modularity. One difference is in the level of analysis: modularity at the anatomical level vs. modularity at the functional level. A claim of anatomical modularity for second language (L2) knowledge would be a claim that L2 knowledge is localized in a specific, well defined area of the brain. Such a claim stands or falls independently of a claim of cognitive modularity: the claim that L2 knowledgehowever and wherever instantiated physiologically -is a module within a larger system of knowledge. The mutual independence of these two modularity claims is often overlooked in the literature. If, for instance, we were to find that all L2 performance activated one specific corner of the brain and no other, we would of course have grounds for claiming that L2 competence is anatomically modular. That anatomical modularity would certainly be suggestive evidence for the cognitive modularity of L2 knowledge. And if that L2 corner were different from the first language (L1) corner, then this might suggest that L1 knowledge and L2 knowledge were cognitively different, that there are two separate cognitive modules for language competence. But such a conclusion would not automatically follow, any more than the conclusion that the books on the third floor of the library stacks are categorically different from those on the first. And by the same token, just as books on the same subject may be shelved in two widely separate locations simply according to age or size or date of acquisition, so would the discovery of multiple 'L2 areas' in the brain be consistent with L2 as a cognitive module.
Putting aside anatomical modularity, we can distinguish between two different understandings of cognitive modularity, what we might call Chomsky-modularity and Fodor-modularity (Segal, 1996; Schwartz, 1999) . A Chomsky-module is, in effect, a specialized database. The language faculty is Chomsky-modular in that -and to the extent that -it comprises structures and conforms to principles not found in other modules: binding principles, say, or the Subset Principle. L2 knowledge would be Chomsky-modular if it is part of a hypothesized language module, or indeed if it was itself such a module.
L2 knowledge would be Fodor-modular if it is (to a significant degree) cognitively impenetrable and informationally encapsulated: that is to say, if the processing of linguistic input is neither significantly affected by, nor accessible to, higher cognitive functions (beliefs, say) or other input systems (Fodor, 1983) . The key word here is 'processing': Fodor-modules are input-processing systems. The connection between Fodor-modules and Chomsky-modules is that presumably they are paired off; the putative Chomsky-module for language is accessed only by a corresponding Fodor-module, and the Fodor-module has access only to data from the Chomskymodule. One could, however, accept the idea of a Chomsky-module for language while denying Fodor-modularity: one could accept the idea of domain-specific principles for language knowledge, while claiming that linguistic processing is not encapsulated.
Note that the idea of domain specificity, as outlined above, can all too easily be trivialized, and indeed often is. After all, knowledge of baseball is domain specific: it has concepts found nowhere else, like SQUEEZE PLAY and INFIELD FLY RULE, and it has domain-specific principles, such as the criteria for judging a checked swing. What is needed to make a claim of Chomsky-modularity interesting, of course, is the additional claim of innateness: the claim that not only is there a module comprising language-specific principles, but further that these principles are not learned. Thus, we can classify possible property theories of L2 competence according to whether or not they posit the existence of an innate, domain-specific representational system for language: whether, to put it crudely, the concepts NOUN or C-COMMAND in the language system have the same ontological status as, say, the concept of CONSPECIFIC'S FACE in the visual system, or whether they are rather in the same class as the concept SQUEEZE PLAY. UG theories of L2 knowledge, clearly, are of the former type of theory. Emergentism denies the innateness of linguistic concepts. It takes, in fact, a typically empiricist stance: it can accept innate capacities and functions, but draws the line at innate content, or what used to be known as innate ideas.
For a transition theory for SLA, on the other hand, the central issue will be, 'What sorts of learning mechanisms are there?' Specifically, the transition-theoretic question that divides mad dog nativist theories of language acquisition from emergentist theories is whether or not there are forms of learning other than association. UG-oriented SLA theories, of course, allow for -indeed, requirenon-inductive learning, specifically parameter setting. Emergentists, being empiricists, accept nothing but associative learning.
So the lines are drawn: On the one hand, we have mad dog nativist theories, which posit a rich, innate representational system specific to the language faculty, and non-associative mechanisms, as well as associative ones, for bringing that system to bear on input to create an L2 grammar. On the other hand, we have the emergentist position, which denies both the innateness of linguistic representations (Chomsky-modularity), and the domain-specificity of language learning mechanisms (Fodor-modularity) . The mad dog position has been around for some time in SLA, of course; what do the emergentists have to say?
III The emergentist critique of 'special nativist' theories
First of all, what is wrong with UG/SLA and other such mad dog nativist theories? What grounds are there for thinking that an emergentist approach to SLA is likely to be superior? Emergentists offer several fundamental criticisms of UG-style nativism, a few of which I briefly discuss here: there are what I call the Argument from Vacuity, the Argument from Simplicity, the Argument from Neuroscience and the Argument from Evolution. All four are a priori arguments against nativism and in favour of the plausibility of emergentism. I introduce them here in order to reject them, but not, I stress, in order to reject emergentism or to support nativism. Rather, it is important that these a priori arguments be seen for the red herrings that they are, in order that the emergentist vs. nativist debate can be conducted on a level playing field.
The Argument from Vacuity
The Argument from Vacuity is usually framed as an argument against 'the innateness hypothesis'; in fact, the odds are 9 in 10 that someone who uses the phrase 'the innateness hypothesis' is either explicitly offering or tacitly supporting this argument. (And the odds are 99 in 100 that whoever uses the phrase will never bother to state the hypothesis, but that is another problem.) The idea is that calling a given property 'innate' does not solve anything: it simply calls a probably premature halt to investigation of the property. In Putnam's words, 'Invoking "Innateness" only postpones the problem of learning; it does not solve it' (Putnam, 1975: 143) . Thus, calling UG (or some putative principle of UG such as the Minimal Link Condition, or whatever) innate simply is a way to escape the difficult problem of determining how language is learned.
On the face of it, this is a peculiar form of argument. After all, what if the Minimal Link Condition is in fact innate? One cannot, after all, simply dismiss that possibility out of hand. Certainly one does not hear parallel arguments in biology; no one argues that calling the circulation of blood by the heart innate is simply escaping the difficult problem of determining how the heart learns to circulate blood. There are, in fact, two rather gross problems with the Argument from Vacuity.
First of all, it is common ground that there are, indeed, innate properties. And it is still an open question just which properties are innate. Circulation is pretty generally acknowledged to be one such property, while knowledge of squeeze plays is pretty generally excluded from the list; but the jury is still out on a whole range of others, language included. Which is to say that it is glaringly question-begging to argue that calling UG innate prevents us from investigating how language is learned. Indeed, the shoe -if there is one -is on the other foot. Thanks to genetics and microbiology, we now have a pretty good idea of how to give content to the term 'innate'. That is, 'innate' can now be used as a technical term (see, for example, Ariew, 1999) . But what does 'learning' mean? Fodor is not alone in thinking that empiricists lack 'an independent characterization of "learned"; one that does not amount to just the denial of "innate" ' (2001: 103) . 1 The question of the innateness or non-innateness of any given part of the language faculty remains an open question, of course, but an empirical one. In particular, there is no justification for excluding, in principle, the idea that there could be innate propositional content.
The second problem with the Argument from Vacuity is that, as a matter of fact, it is false: calling property P innate is virtually never the end of the line. One can hardly have failed to notice that over the past few decades linguists have been investigating, theorizing about, and often getting into nasty arguments over, just how to characterize the putatively innate language faculty. I have yet to see a published article arguing that since P is innate there is nothing more to be said.
The 'innateness hypothesis', in the hands of its critics, is usually some sort of caricature of the argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus (POS), viz., 'Property P cannot be learned; therefore it is innate'. But in fact the POS argument is rather more nuanced than that, as well as less positive. The argument, as lucidly formulated by Laurence and Margolis (2001: 221) , goes something like this: 1) An indefinite number of alternative sets of principles are consistent with the regularities found in the primary linguistic data.
2) The correct set of principles need not be (and typically is not) in any pretheoretic sense simpler or more natural than the alternatives.
3) The data that would be needed for choosing among these sets of principles are in many cases not the sort of data that are available to an empiricist learner. 2 4) So if children were empiricist learners, they could not reliably arrive at the correct grammar for their language. 5) Children do reliably arrive at the correct grammar for their language. 6) Therefore, children are not empiricist learners.
And mutatis mutandis for adult L2 learners: If adults were empiricist learners, they would not reliably arrive at certain kinds of L2 knowledge; adults do (often, sometimes) arrive at such knowledge; therefore, adult L2 learners are not empiricist learners. The reasoning is the same, only the empirical claims about acquisition are on shakier ground. In any case, POS arguments are not vacuous handwaving; they are powerful arguments that need to be rebutted, not dismissed. Emergentists need to show that the POS argument for language acquisition is false, by showing that empiricist learning suffices for language acquisition. In other words, they need to show that the stimuli are not impoverished, that the environment is indeed rich enough, and rich in the right ways, to bring about the emergence of linguistic competence. The POS argument does not let nativists off the hook, of course; they are still obliged to give compelling reasons for believing that Premise 3 above is correct. But given the difficulties in demonstrating a negative, the burden would seem to be on the emergentist to refute Premise 3.
The Argument from Simplicity
Another common a priori argument against nativist theories is the Argument from Simplicity. Bates et al., for instance, give simplicity as one reason for preferring what they see as 'general nativism' in O'Grady's (1991: 37) sense over 'special nativism': because a general nativist account uses fewer mechanisms to explain the same range of cognitive phenomena, it is preferable to special nativism on grounds of elegance and theoretical austerity.
The simplicity argument seems to have quite a seductive appeal, but it is virtually without force. For one thing, of course, it is extremely hard to measure simplicity even in the best of circumstances. More to the point is that it is not a question of how many mechanisms you use to explain a set of phenomena, it is a question of how many mechanisms you need to provide the best explanation of the phenomena. After all, I can explain all the phenomena of SLA by using just one mechanism, God's saving grace. Simplicity is just not a criterion that can be applied a priori; we have to wait until there actually are two candidate theories with a reasonable claim to account for the same set of phenomena. Perhaps I do not need to point out that that day has not yet arrived.
The Argument from Neuroscience
The Argument from Neuroscience says that an innate UG is neurologically implausible, hence that UG -if it exists at all -must emerge from less specifically dedicated neural structures. As Ellis puts it, 'Innate specification of synaptic connectivity in the cortex is unlikely. On these grounds, linguistic representational nativism seems untenable ' (1998: 640) . Says Elman, 'In brains . . . a claim for representational innateness is equivalent to saying that the genome somehow predetermines the synapses between neurons' (1999: 3). The idea is that the brain, or at least the cortex, is an organ of great plasticity, and that the specific function carried out by a specific bit of cortex is not 'hardwired'. Thus, neurons that would form part of the auditory system in a hearing human will, in the case of congenital nonfunction of the ear, be recruited to the optical system. Again, transplanting cortical tissue from its 'normal' place to another location will lead to that tissue taking on the function of its new neighbours. So if not even visual cognitive functions are 'hardwired', it is all the less likely that UG is. Or so goes the argument. As MacWhinney puts it, 'Nativism is wrong because it makes untestable assumptions about genetics and unreasonable assumptions about the hard-coding of complex formal rules in neural tissue ' (2000: 728) .
This might seem a compelling argument, if only it were in any way relevant. But it is a straw man argument: pace MacWhinney, nativists do not make unreasonable assumptions about the hardcoding of rules in neural tissue. They do not make reasonable ones either, since in general they do not make claims of any sort about how rules are instantiated in neural tissue.
3 Nativist claims -for instance, the claim that there is an innate UG -are claims about the mind, not about the brain. Nor is there any contradiction whatever in holding that UG is innate while at the same time denying that it is hardwired. To use a distinction made by Samuels, nativists like Chomsky and Fodor are 'organism nativists', whereas what the emergentists are attacking is 'tissue nativism': 'contemporary theorists who defend nativism about representations are concerned with claims about what innate mental representations people . . . possess and not claims about the properties of specific pieces of neural tissue' (Samuels, 1998: 560; emphasis in original) .
Of course it is common ground that the mind is instantiated in the brain, and thus if brain science could show that it is impossible to instantiate UG in a brain, the claim of an innate UG would clearly fail (as, for that matter, would the claim of an acquired UG). 4 But of course brain science has not shown any such impossibility; indeed, brain science has not yet been able to show how any cognitive capacity is instantiated.
But not only are nativist claims about the mind not claims about the brain, they should also not be. There seems to be a fairly widespread feeling that neurological explanations are somehow more 'real' or 'basic' than cognitive explanations; this is a serious mistake. Of course explanation in terms of neurons is at a finer grain than explanation in terms of parameters. But if finegrainedness is the criterion for theoretical explanation, why stop at neurons? Why not demand an explanation of language competence at the level of subatomic particles? It is not simply that the current state of the art does not yet permit us to propose theories of language acquisition at the neural level; it is rather that the neural level is likely not ever to be the appropriate level at which to account for cognitive capacities like language, any more than the physical level is the appropriate level at which to account for the phenomena of economics. As Gold and Stoljar put it, 'What determines the form of a successful theory is where the best explanation is to be found ' (1999: 825; compare Fodor, 1974; Pylyshyn, 1984; Eubank and Gregg, 1995; Rey, 1997: chapter 6.4) . There is no reason whatever for thinking that the neural level is now, or ever will be, the level where the best explanation of language competence or language acquisition is to be found. In short, whether there is a UG, and if there is whether it is innate, are definitely open questions; but they cannot be answered in the negative merely by appealing to neural implausibility.
The Argument from Evolution
The final a priori emergentist argument against nativism that I want to discuss is the Argument from Evolution. This says that there is nothing remotely like UG in any other species, and hence that it is wildly unlikely that it could have evolved; thus, even if there were something like UG, it could not possibly be innate. Bates et al. (1991: 30) state the argument thus:
104 The state of emergentism in SLA 4 Ellis says that 'it appears that UG could only fall if "brain science could show it is impossible to instantiate UG in a brain''. By such reasoning, I guess the alternative "God's saving grace" theory also holds.' Nonsense; a theory of UG could fail (I assume that is what Ellis means by 'UG could fall') in any of a number of ways, including by being shown to be explanatorily inferior to another theory (including, of course, a theory of emergentism). The recent history of 'Chomskian' linguistic theory, from TG to GB to P&P to Minimalism, is a history of such failures. None of these UG theories is immune to a demonstration that the postulated UG is not realizable in a human brain; but they are all immune -as is emergentism, mutatis mutandis -to a mere claim that it just cannot be so realized.
How did language evolve in our species in the first place? If the basic structural principles of language cannot be learned (bottom-up) or derived (top-down), there are only two possible explanations for their existence: Either universal grammar was endowed to us directly by the Creator, or else our species has undergone a mutation of unprecedented magnitude, a cognitive equivalent of the Big Bang.
It is often further alleged that in the absence of an account of the development of UG in evolutionary terms, UG-style nativist theories are ipso facto inadequate property theories of language competence. Deacon, for instance, claims that 'an adequate formal account of language competence does not provide an adequate account of how it arose through natural selection, and the search for some new structures in the human brain to fulfil this theoretical vacuum, like the search for phlogiston, has no obvious end point ' (1997: 38) .
There are various ways to respond to the Argument from Evolution. One could, for instance, try to show that in fact one can account for the evolution of the language faculty in orthodox Darwinian terms of natural selection and adaptation (e.g., Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Bickerton, 1995; Berwick, 1998; Jackendoff, 1999) . There is an easier way, though, to deal with this argument, without having to support any particular proposal for the evolution of UG. Rather than try to show that the Argument from Evolution is false, it is enough for our purposes simply to note that it is empty.
Deacon complains that UG theories cannot explain the origin of UG: Well, no one expected them to; property theories are not transition theories.
5 If a proper understanding of some phenomenon depends upon an understanding of the origin of the phenomenon, we are in big trouble. We have a pretty good idea, for instance, of how birds can fly. We have, that is, property theories from aerodynamics and physiology that give us the mechanisms for flight.
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We have a much less clear idea, on the other hand, of how bird flight evolved. But even if we knew absolutely nothing about bird evolution, even if there were not a single fossil to be found, the adequacy of our explanation of how birds can fly would not be impugned in the slightest (compare Fodor, 2000) . And if this is true for bird flight, why not for language competence? Once again, it is a question of how to provide the best explanation; if UG is the best explanation, so be it. How UG came to be is another problem; an interesting one, of course, and one that it would be great if we could solve, but still another problem.
But of course the more serious charge is not that we have no explanation of how UG could have evolved, but that UG could not have evolved, in the absence of a wholly implausible mutation. The logic of this argument may seem compelling, but in fact it is fatally flawed, and for reasons much like those that vitiate the Argument from Neuroscience. Briefly, the problem is this: It is common ground that, just as the various faculties of our mind are instantiated in our brain, so too the evolution of these faculties depends on the evolution of the brain. But just as we do not know a thing about how the brain instantiates any cognitive function, by the same token we do not have a clue as to how evolutionary changes in our ancestors' brains could have led to the sort of language competence that we clearly do have.
In fact, given the commonly accepted fact that our species is unique in its possession of a language faculty that has no counterpart in even our nearest relatives among the primates, it would be perfectly reasonable to conclude, not that this faculty is acquired by every member of the species after birth on the basis of environmental stimuli, but rather that it is an innate faculty that did not evolve as an adaptation. Darwin, at least, gives us no reason to reject this conclusion out of hand. As Fodor says:
Unlike our minds, our brains are, by any gross measure, very similar to those of apes. So it looks as though relatively small alterations of brain structure must have produced very large behavioral discontinuities in the transition from the ancestral apes to us. If that is right, then you do not have to assume that cognitive complexity is shaped by the gradual action of Darwinian selection on prehuman behavioural phenotypes [1998: 209] . For all anybody knows, our minds could have gotten here largely at a leap even if our brains did not [1998: 167] .
If you buy into the Argument from Evolution, there would seem to be two options open to you: 1) You can deny what seems self-evident, the gross differences between human cognition and ape cognition with respect to language. This option has been taken, for instance, by many of those studying the 'language' of chimpanzees, and the results are hardly impressive. Or: 2) You can try to account for those differences without positing anything like a UG. This option is the one chosen by emergentists, and of course it is a perfectly legitimate option. It is just not an option that is forced on one by the Argument from Evolution, because the Argument from Evolution is not valid.
IV Empiricist emergentism
So far we have entertained and rejected several arguments frequently offered to show the a priori plausibility of emergentism, or at least the implausibility of mad dog nativism. Rejecting these arguments, of course, does not in itself confirm nativism or refute emergentism; it simply helps clear the ground prior to building a case for or against emergentism. We have now to look at emergentism's positive proposals for explaining language competence and its acquisition.
The emergentist property theory
To start with, what sort of property theory do emergentists offer to replace the theory of UG? Unfortunately, there seems to be little unanimity, and less specificity, among emergentists on this question. Allen and Seidenberg, for instance, characterize the goal of the emergentist programme as 'to make explicit the experiential and constitutional factors that account for the development of knowledge structures underlying linguistic performance ' (1999: 119) . This is not too helpful, since it sounds rather like the goal of nativist theory. Ellis believes that ' "rules" of language, at all levels of analysis (from phonology, through syntax, to discourse), are structural regularities that emerge from learners' lifetime analysis of the distributional characteristics of the language input ' (2002a: 144) , while 'the acquisition of grammar is the piecemeal learning of many thousands of constructions and the frequency-biased abstraction of regularities within them ' (2002a: 168) . This would seem to be an attempt to finesse the question of the property theory by eliminating any domain-specific representations with causal powers. It is squeeze plays all the way, as it were. The underlying competence of a language learner from this perspective consists of an ability to do distributional analyses and an ability to remember 
The emergentist transition theory
Emergentism is clearer on the transition theory: Language is acquired through associative learning. When Ellis, for instance, speaks of 'learners' lifetime analysis of the distributional characteristics of the input' or the 'piecemeal learning of thousands of constructions and the frequency-biased abstraction of regularities', he's talking of association in the standard empiricist sense. The only difference is that these days, one can model associative learning processes with connectionist networks. Thus, it is hoped, the longstanding promissory note of associationism can at last be cashed in. If empiricist emergentism is to be a viable rival to mad dog nativism, it is important -perhaps even essential -that connectionism can be recruited to implement the emergentist transition theory. It should be noted, though, that connectionism itself is not a theory, the 'ism' notwithstanding; in Lachter and Bever's words, 'connectionism is no more a psychological theory than is Boolean algebra ' (1988: 196) . It is a method, and one that in principle is neutral as to the kind of theory to which it is applied. There would thus be nothing contradictory about a nativist theory of SLA, say, that included connectionist learning as a component -although not the sole component -of its transition theory. On the other hand, it would be a contradiction for an emergentist to allow nativist mechanisms like deductive learning, triggering or parameter-setting. Thus, as Rey (1997) points out, emergentism, at least of the sort that Ellis is advocating, is in the disadvantageous position of having to demonstrate nonexistence, a difficult job in the best of circumstances.
V Connectionist models
In any case, we need to look at connectionist models of acquisition to see how emergentism implements its transition theory. Connectionist models of acquisition are often claimed to have a number of inherent advantages over standard so-called Classical models that use symbols and rules: Ellis and Schmidt (1998: 317) , for instance, enumerate several such commonly cited advantages:
(a) they are neurally inspired, (b) they incorporate distributed representation and control of information, (c) they are data-driven with prototypical representations emerging as a natural outcome of the learning process rather than being prespecified and innately given by the modellers as in more nativist cognitive accounts, (d) they show graceful degradation as do humans with language disorder, and (e) they are in essence models of learning and acquisition rather than static descriptions.
These putative advantages should be taken with a grain of salt.
'Neurally inspired': The claim of neural inspiration would, even if true, be of precious little consequence; who cares how you are inspired? But in fact, the resemblance between artificial neural networks and the real thing is in the eye of the modeller. The use of the term 'neural network' to denote connectionist models is perhaps the most successful case of false advertising since the term 'pro-life'. Virtually no modeller actually makes any specific claims about analogies between the model and the brain, and for good reason: As Marinov says, 'Connectionist systems, as well as symbolic systems which make no commitments as to their exact implementation in the brain, have contributed essentially no insight into how knowledge is represented in the brain' (Marinov, 1993: 256 ; emphasis in original). Christiansen and Chater, who are themselves connectionists, put it more strongly: 'But connectionist nets are not realistic models of the brain . . ., either at the level of individual processing unit, which drastically oversimplifies and knowingly falsifies many features of real neurons, or in terms of network structure, which typically bears no relation to brain architecture ' (1999: 419) . In particular, it should be noted that backpropagation, which is the learning algorithm almost universally used in connectionist models of language acquisition (see below), is also universally recognized to be a biological impossibility; no brain process known to science corresponds to backpropagation (Smolensky, 1988; Clark, 1993; Stich, 1994; Marcus, 1998b) . Distributed representations: Whether the use of distributed representations is an advantage or not is not settled. But advantageous or not, it does not distinguish connectionist models from traditional nativist models. Not all connectionist models use distributed representations; indeed, Ellis and Schmidt's model, which we will look at below, is localist, one node representing one lexical item or concept or object. And on the other hand, there are unashamedly nativist theories that make use of distributed representations: think of the distinctive features of generative phonology. Data-driven: Similarly, being data-driven is not a connectionist specialty; all models of learning are data-driven, at least in the sense that they require input to work. Graceful degradation: Nor does graceful degradation distinguish between connectionist and nativist learning models. There are socalled TDIDT (top-down inductive decision tree) models, for instance, that degrade as gracefully as backpropagation models, with the same or greater accuracy, and taking up to a thousand times less training time (Shavlik et al., 1991; Ling and Marinov, 1993) . And on the other hand, some connectionist models are subject to what is called 'catastrophic interference' or 'catastrophic forgetting', where learning new material leads to the rapid unlearning of previously learned information. For instance, an idiosyncratic fact about one member of a set can get generalized across the set, so that, for instance, having learned that a penguin is a bird and that a penguin can swim but cannot fly, the model forgets that other birds can fly (Marcus, 2001) . Or learning the sums of 2 + 1 through 2 + 9 and 1 + 2 through 9 + 2 leads to forgetting the previously learned sums of 1 + 1 through 9 + 1 and 1 + 2 through 1 + 9 (French, 1999 ). Ability to learn: As for ability to learn, of course connectionist models can learn, and of course models of linguistic competence cannot. They are not supposed to. But nativist, symbolic learning models can learn. As Fodor says, 'Any device whose computational proclivities are labile to its computational history is thereby able to learn, and this truism includes networks and classical machines indiscriminately' (1998: 85; emphasis in original). There are in fact 'classical' systems that learn to recognize patterns, and these have been around since 1966 (McLaughlin and Warfield, 1994) .
Anyway, how do connectionist models acquire linguistic knowledge? A standard network, as we all know, consists of two sets of nodes: input units and output units, connected via a third set of so-called hidden units. The strengths of the various connections between input and output units are usually set at random initially -say, between 0 and 1 -and then adjusted with each activation, usually by the process of backpropagation. Backpropagation is a process wherein a given connection strength is compared to the desired value and adjusted slightly in the right direction according to a given algorithm. Ideally, after a sufficient number of activations and adjustments, the network arrives at a connection strength of 1 for an appropriate input-unit/output-unit pair, and a strength of 0 for all the other connections to those two units.
VI The Ellis and Schmidt model
To take a specific example directly relevant to SLA, consider Ellis and Schmidt's model of the acquisition of plural prefixes for a miniature artificial language (Ellis and Schmidt, 1997; . Ellis and Schmidt 'investigated adult acquisition of second language morphology using an artificial second language in which frequency and regularity were factorially combined ' (1997: 149) . The primary purpose of the research was to test 'whether human morphological abilities can be understood in terms of associative processes ' (1997: 145) and to show that 'a basic principle of learning, the power law of practice, also generates frequency by regularity interactions ' (1998: 309) . Human subjects were shown 20 pictures of single objects -say, an umbrella -and simultaneously heard a word, say 'broll'. Having learned the names for the 20 objects, they were then shown two umbrellas and heard, say, 'bubroll' or 'mibroll' or whatever. Of the 20 nouns, the plural prefix for 10 was bu-; each of the other 10 had a different prefix. From these data one might be inclined to conclude, of course, that bu-was the regular plural prefix in this language.
Next, Ellis and Schmidt trained a network to learn the same sort of thing. Their network had 22 input units (I-units): 20 corresponding to pictures of single objects, one more of the same as a test item and one other I-unit representing plurality. There were 32 output units (O-units): 1-21 to represent the singular nouns corresponding to the 'pictures' I-1 to 21, and 11 units for the 11 prefixes. The I-units were connected to the O-units by a varying number of hidden units, at least eight being required for successful results.
The results of the simulation look quite impressive. The learning curves for the network are strikingly similar to those for the human subjects. Granted, there is rather a difference in the amount of exposure required to reach asymptote: something like 1200 exposures for the humans vs. something like 56 000 for the network.
But I am not going to make a big thing out of that, aside from noting that networks take a lot of time to learn. As Schmidt (1994: 193) pointed out some years ago, 'one of the merits of connectionism, its gradualism, is also its greatest weakness.' The backpropagation algorithm requires multiple, cumulative, small adjustments in connection strength; it is only because we now have powerful, high-speed computers that these simulations can be run in the first place. Ling and Marinov, comparing various connectionist and symbolic models, find that 'BP is usually several orders of magnitude slower ' (1993: 253) . Ellis thinks that 'The real stuff of language acquisition is the slow acquisition of form-function mappings and the regularities therein. This, like other skills, takes tens of thousands of hours of practice ' (2002a: 175) . Actually, that is a bit of an exaggeration: a 5-year-old has been alive less than 44 000 hours, presumably awake rather less than that, and presumably 'on task' a good deal less than that. In any case, Ellis is committing what I think is called a distributive fallacy, like saying that since the army is large each soldier is also large. Learning a whole language no doubt takes a good deal of time; it hardly follows that learning each element of a language takes a good deal of time. Work by Carey, Bloom and others on so-called 'fast mapping' (e.g., Carey, 1978; Bloom, 2000) shows that learners can acquire lexical knowledge virtually instantly, on the basis of one or two inputs, a fact that leads Bloom, for one, to conclude that 'The fact that object name acquisition is both fast and errorless suggests that it is not the product of an associationist process ' (2002: 40) . A connectionist model is incapable of this kind of learning, unless of course the modeller simply sets the relevant connection strength to 1 to start with, in which case of course the model is not learning.
Still, the learning of morphological markers like plural or past tense is generally agreed to be noninstantaneous. So putting aside the question of time, let us look a little closer at the Ellis and Schmidt model. There are several questions we can ask: What has the model learned? What more could it learn? How was it able to learn what it did? And, most importantly, what do simulations like this tell us about human language learning?
What has the network learned?
One might want to say that the network has learned both the singular and plural forms for 20 nonce nouns, and has learned the 'regular' or 'default' plural prefix as well. Are these inferences justified?
Well, strictly speaking, of course, the network, unlike the human subjects, was presented with neither pictures nor words; computers cannot see or hear. What the network did was to come to associate certain sequences of zeros and ones with other sequences, the sequences being stipulated by the modellers to be pictures or words or prefixes. Now, it would be churlish to harp on this feature of connectionist networks; after all, it is just a fact of computational life that this is how you have to program a computer. But it is worth noting that the results would not be any different if we had changed our stipulations, so that instead of prefixes the O-units were suffixes, or examples of zero conversion or suppletion, or some of each. Indeed, there is nothing preventing the connections in this network from being simultaneous rather than sequential; as if, say, the plural of 'broll' was not 'bu' followed by 'broll' but 'bu/broll' somehow spoken at once.
Note that the network did not learn either the 20 nouns, or the 11 prefixes; it merely learned to associate the nouns with the prefixes (and with the pictures). This is a general characteristic of connectionist networks: in Quartz's words, 'Rather than learn by creating internal representations, as they have often been characterized, they actually learn by eliminating elements of an a priori defined hypothesis space to those that are consistent with the training examples ' (1993: 231-32) . Thus, this model started with a set of 11 prefixes, and was trained such that only one prefix was reinforced for any given word. This is rather a serious problem for an emergentist account of acquisition. Remember that emergentists are representationalists; they are as committed as nativists are to the existence of linguistic representations -of some sort or other -as the basis of our language capacity. On the other hand, they are anti-nativist, of course; which is to say they need an explanation of how the representations are acquired. Now, in this particular model, the representations are comparatively unproblematic: the human subjects were given pictures and sounds to associate, and the network was given analogous input units to associate with output units. On the other hand, where the humans were shown two pictures and were left to infer plurality (rather than, say, duality or repetition or some other inappropriate concept), the network was given the concept of PLURALITY free as one of the input nodes (and was given no other concept). Of course, a mad dog nativist will have no problem with the claim that the concept of PLURALITY is innate. But an emergentist is committed to assuming that the concept is acquired and, if that is the case, then to that extent this model is fudging; innate knowledge has sneaked in the back door, as it were.
Not only that, but it seems safe to predict that the human subjects, having learned to associate the picture of an umbrella with the word 'broll', would also be able to go on to identify an actual umbrella as a 'broll', or a sculpture or a hologram of an umbrella as representations of a 'broll'. In fact, no subject would infer that 'broll' means 'picture of an umbrella'. And nor would any subject infer that 'broll' meant the one specific umbrella represented by the picture. But there is no reason whatever to think that the network can make similar inferences. The network was given a 'picture' of an umbrella and came to associate it with the 'word' 'broll'; but since pictures of umbrellas are not umbrellas, presumably the network would need another input unit to represent the real thing. The emergentist might claim that we can generalize from the picture to the real umbrella on the basis of a set of features the two items have in common. We look at that claim in a moment, but in any case this model has no set of features on which to generalize; it has only input units stipulated to represent pictures of things, not to represent things themselves. In other words, it is entirely unclear in what sense one can claim that the network has learned the meaning of 'broll'.
Again, it is reasonable to guess that the human subjects would have expected further examples of nouns -including, of course, abstract nouns for which there could be no picture -to have plural markers of some sort, and specifically plural prefixes, including perhaps irregulars not encountered in training. A human learner, that is, would be surprised to discover that the tens of thousands of other nouns in the language are unmarked as to number, or are marked by suffixes. But there is no reason for the network to have made this sort of inference, except that the possibility is denied from the outset, in that the only output units available are the 11 stipulated to be prefixes. This is equivalent to innate knowledge: for the network to learn that all nouns have plural prefixes -as opposed to learning the plural form for all nouns -it would need something like an output unit representing 'no plural marker', to which the connections from noun units would have a strength of zero. In principle, as has often been pointed out, networks are capable of making all kinds of weird associations that no human would ever make, such as associating tense markers with nouns. The connectionist thus has to explain why humans do not make those kinds of associations even though, on the connectionist account, they should be capable of doing so. If humans are not innately predisposed to make certain kinds of inductions and avoid others, then the burden of instruction falls on the environment, and the connectionist theorist is obliged to show how the environment could constrain the learning situation such that seemingly nonnatural inductions are never made. And on the other hand, the connectionist has to show how the environment can instruct the learner to make certain generalizations beyond the input, as from umbrella picture to umbrella-an-sich. Needless to say, these explanatory obligations remain undischarged.
One more question about what the network learned: Did it acquire any knowledge that would do the work carried out by a rule in a symbolic system? Specifically, did it establish bu-as the default prefix which should be attached to any new noun in the absence of evidence to the contrary? Remember that there was one input unit, I-21, which was trained to connect with O-21: in other words, a picture of a single shoe or something, to be associated with its name. Ellis and Schmidt treated this unit as a wug test for the network, by only training the network on the singular form. When then tested with the plural prefixes activated, the input unit formed a connection with the aregular' prefix at about 0.6 strength. Ellis and Schmidt consider this result to be passing the wug test. Are they justified?
Well, consider what a wug test is supposed to show in human subjects. It is usually supposed to show that a subject has internalized a morphological rule. What characterizes a rule in the standard sense is that it supports counterfactuals. That is, if 'zoop' were a noun, it would have bu-as its plural marker. Note the deductive structure. The nice thing about rules is precisely that they are deductive, although they may be achieved on the basis of induction. Given a rule of pluralization, a learner gets the plural form of all nouns yet to appear in the input free, without training and regardless of input frequency. The network's one putative wugtesting item was, note, in the training set from the start; thus, as a result of training, it had formed connections of varying strengths to all 32 output units, both 'words' and 'prefixes'. It just was not activated when 'plural' was. So all we know is that, given a noun in the singular as part of the training set, the network was able to develop a strongish tendency to associate that noun with the 'regular' or 'default' plural prefix. ('[W] hen the larger models are presented with a plural stimulus which they have only ever previously experienced as a single form, there is a tendency for them to generalize and apply the regular plural morpheme (bu-) in the same way that humans might generalize that the plural of "wug" is "wugs'' ' (Ellis and Schmidt, 1998: 326.) What did the humans do? Interestingly enough, we do not know (nor do we know the connection strengths for the other prefixes); Ellis and Schmidt did not run a wug test on the humans. Thus, we do not know whether the humans, or some of them, had induced a plural rule, and of course it is perfectly plausible, with such limited input, that they did not. But if they had, then we could confidently predict that, given a new 'noun', they would not 'tend to generalize', but rather would pluralize it with the regular prefix.
What more could this network learn?
We have already seen that the network did manage to form a connection strength of over 0.5 between the default prefix and a noun that it had encountered repeatedly in the singular, without training on that particular noun in the plural. This test noun, though, was in the training set; in fact, there is no reason to believe that this network could learn new nouns and their plurals in the absence of intensive training, of the sort conducted for the original 20 nouns. As Quartz (1993: 30) says, 'connectionist models in general are incapable of representing any concept h that is not an element of its initial state G.' Connectionist networks are characterized by what Marcus calls 'training independence': 'What the model learns about how to treat one set of inputs does not generalize to how the model treats the next set of inputs ' (1998a: 166) . But of course humans are incredibly good at generalizing; that is why we Englishspeakers know all the plurals of all the nouns in the language (except the few irregulars, of course), whether or not we even know the nouns. A true wug test of the model would require the addition of a new input unit (picture) and a new output unit (singular noun); passing that wug test would mean forming a strong connection between the two and the default prefix when the plural input unit was also activated, without prior training on the noun. Actually, given that a human with a plural rule can instantaneously extend the rule to all future cases of nouns, a successful model would need to be able to connect plurality, bu-, and thousands of new output units, without training.
How was the network able to learn whatever it learned?
Well, to start with, the network was presented with 21 'pictures', 21 'words' and 11 'prefixes', all of which were associated with each other from the start, although at varying strengths of connectivity. What the model had to do, then, was strengthen the one correct connection -ideally, to 1 -and weaken all the irrelevant connections -ideally, to zero. Presumably the human analogue would be that the more experiences a learner has of an umbrella being referred to as 'umbrella' rather than 'can opener', one of his or her associations will strengthen and the other will weaken; and similarly for 'umbrellas' rather than 'umbrellae'. This strengthening and weakening is carried out by the backpropagation algorithm. It might seem at first that the network has knowledge of the 'correct' connections built in; and in fact it does. But in this case it is not a problem: The environment, in the form of activations of units, is presumably the source of the changes in connection strengths, just as actual hearings of 'umbrellas' and nonhearings of 'umbrellae' presumably strengthen and weaken the respective singular-plural connections. However, the reason that this is not a problem here is that we have plausible candidates for environmental stimuli that can have an instructive effect on the learner. In other words, the POS argument is here, to that extent, overcome. The question is, are such stimuli always available for language learning? The nativist reply, of course, is a resounding 'no'.
What does this model tell us about human language learning?
I chose Ellis and Schmidt's model for illustrative purposes because it is comparatively simple and small-scale, because it focuses on an area -morphological acquisition -where associative learning would plausibly seem to have a role to play in human language learning even on a mad dog nativist account, and because the results seem strikingly similar to results with human subjects.
7 But even here there are a number of serious problems:
a Generalizability: The network shows no evidence of being able to generalize beyond its training set: a drawback common to connectionist models of this sort, as Marcus and others have shown. For instance, Marcus (1998b) trained Elman's highly-touted sentence-prediction model (Elman, 1990) on sentences like 'a rose is a rose, a lily is a lily, a tulip is a tulip', and also on sentences like 'the bee sniffs the blicket, the bee sniffs the rose' -yet the network Kevin R. Gregg 117 7 Ellis reminds me that the 'Ellis and Schmidt simulations were not set up as explanations of all language acquisition, nor indeed of the acquisition of morphology.' Nor am I treating them as such. But neither do I think I am in any way distorting the picture of what connectionist models can and cannot do to illuminate the processes of SLA. And one could wish that Ellis's modesty regarding 'our small Mickey Mouse models' were displayed in the literature. Ellis (1996: 364) , for instance, lists this model as one of two that 'demonstrate how one distributed associative learning system can mimic the human learning characteristics of regular and irregular inflectional morphology . . . ' In Ellis (1998: 652) he cites the model as one that has 'successfully captured the regularities that are present . . . between referents . . . and associated . . . plural forms', a claim repeated verbatim in Ellis (2002a: 155) and claims that it and other such models 'strongly support the notion that acquisition of morphology is also a result of simple associative learning principles . . . ' Ellis tells us point blank (1999: 27) that the model shows 'that the power law applies to the acquisition of morphosyntax'. Not bad for a small Mickey Mouse model that dealt with only 21 nouns.
could not generalize from these sentences to complete the fragment, 'a blicket is a '. But it is precisely this ability that is necessary if one is going to appeal to connectionist models as support for an associationist learning mechanism in language acquisition, because it is precisely this sort of generalizing that humans can do with ease. If a connectionist network cannot jump from a database of a small number of exemplars to the entire category of which those exemplars are exemplars, what is the point of appealing to connectionist networks? 8 b Encapsulation: Conversely, the model is conveniently inoculated against the influence of any other element in the environment besides the pre-established units. That is, the input nodes could only connect with the output nodes, and the output nodes include only a handful of words and prefixes. With the humans in the lab, the environment was also quite impoverished, but of course in a real acquisition situation there is a good deal more in the environment than just a picture of an umbrella and an utterance of a word. But the richer the environment, the more irrelevant stimuli there should be. The nativist argument, of course, is that the human learner is equipped with innate capacities or predispositions to filter out a good deal (not all) of the irrelevant stimuli.
9 The human learner, on being shown a picture of an umbrella and hearing the utterance 'broll', will likely assume that the colour of the umbrella is irrelevant, as is the height of the speaker and so on. The network, being an empiricist learner, cannot avail itself of such filters, and so the modeller has to tailor the environment to the model, by drastically impoverishing the environment.
118 The state of emergentism in SLA 8 Ellis suggests that I update the discussion here by citing Elman (1998), Dienes et al. (1999) and Lewis and Elman (2002) . Dienes et al. are ' concerned with the problem of how a neural network could model the way people can acquire knowledge in one perceptual domain and apply it to a quite different one' (p. 53). As they acknowledge, though (p. 76), their model succeeds only by freezing the 'core weights' for one domain before training on a second domain, a 'purely arbitrary way of protecting against unlearning' that was necessary to avoid catastrophic interference (see above). Lewis and Elman's model is based on an earlier Elman model (Elman, 1991; and is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge of structure dependence on the basis of statistical information only. It would seem, from my cursory and inexpert reading, to be subject to the same criticisms as those earlier models (e.g., Marcus, 2001) . As would Elman (1998) , where the model fails, as Marcus (2001: 50) notes, to generalize a universally quantified one-to-one function. A regular inflectional rule, for instance, is a universally quantified (all nouns) one-to-one function (if X is a noun, add bu-).
To take another example, Ellis (1998) (2001) points out, each of the new models only solves certain of the problems, so that in order to solve all of them you would need a set of mutually incompatible models. This is modularity gone amok. Ironically, emergentists are fond of harping on the holism of learning: Ellis, for instance, criticizes generativist linguistics for being 'divorced from semantics, the functions of language, and the other social, biological, experiential, and cognitive aspects of human kind ' (1999: 24) . And yet his learning model is as divorced as you can possibly get from all those aspects.
c Innate representations: And while, on the one hand, the network is isolated from the rest of the cognitive system, on the other hand it is surreptitiously endowed with innate concepts; such as, in this case, the concept of plurality. But of course the more innate concepts you give the model, the weaker becomes the argument against nativism; precisely the point made, for instance, by Carroll (1995) in her critique of Sokolik and Smith's (1992) connectionist model of the acquisition of gender in French. The Sokolik and Smith model, for instance, started off 'knowing' that there are two and only two genders in French (there were just two output units). Humans, of course, cannot start off with that knowledge, since in fact there are natural languages with no grammatical gender and other languages with more than two genders. Which is to say that the Sokolik and Smith model, at least in this respect, is actually more nativist than the nativists.
VII Emergentism without connectionism
I have gone on at length about the problems of connectionist modelling of language acquisition because connectionism has been highly touted as a solution to the POS argument; that is, as a way to save empiricism. But aside from the question of what a connectionist model of acquisition can or cannot do, there remains the question of how an emergentist human learner goes about learning. The answer, of course, is associative learning: on the basis of sufficiently frequent pairings of two elements in the environment -'features' is one popular term, 'cues' is another -one abstracts to a general association between the two elements. So, given enough yellow bananas, one learns that bananas are yellow. Given enough plural nouns beginning bu-, one learns that bu-is the plural marker on nouns. And so on. The emergentist idea -contra the POS argument -is that the environment is sufficiently rich to provide the necessary cues for these associations to form.
The question then arises, What is a cue, that the environment could provide it? Ellis, for example, says, 'in the input sentence "The boy loves the parrots," the cues are: preverbal positioning (boy before loves), verb agreement morphology (loves agrees in number with boy rather than parrots), sentence initial positioning and the use of the article the) ' (1998: 653) . In what sense are these 'cues' cues, and in what sense does the environment provide them? What the environment can provide, after all, is only perceptual information, for example, the sounds of the utterance and the order in which they are made. So in order for 'boy before loves' to be a cue that subject comes before verb, the learner must already have the concepts SUBJECT and VERB. But if SUBJECT is one of the learner's concepts, on the emergentist view he or she must have learned that; the concept SUBJECT must 'emerge from learners' lifetime analysis of the distributional characteristics of the language input,' as Ellis (2002a: 144) puts it. Naturally, if we already know that English is SVO, that third person singular subjects take a present tense verb with -s, etc., then this knowledge can help us interpret who loves whom in the parrot sentence, for instance. But this says nothing about how we come to know about subjects or agreement in English. So we need an account of what cues there are in the environment for us to learn the concept SUBJECT so that later on we can use that concept to abstract SVO from other input sentences.
Not only is it unclear how 'preverbal position' could be associated with 'clausal subject' or 'agent of verb', it is also not clear that these should be associated (Gibson, 1992) : For instance, in sentences like 'The mother of the boy loves the parrots' or 'The policeman who followed the boy loves the parrots,' 'the boy' is preverbal but is neither subject nor agent. In short, there is no reason to think that 'comes before the verb' is going to be useful information for a learner or a hearer, in the absence of knowledge of syntactic structure. But once again, the emergentist owes us an explanation of how syntactic structure can be induced from perceptual information in the input. And what decides that 'preverbal position' is a cue, as opposed, say, to 'presence of utterance-final sibilant'?
For instance, the original Rumelhart and McClelland past-tense model, since its input units were phonetic elements, could not distinguish between the past tense of 'ring' (rang) and 'wring' (wrung), not to mention 'ring' (ringed). MacWhinney and Leinbach (1991) MOTION) , for instance, is intentional, as is REMOVE (and, of course, if you can notice REMOVE in the environment, then by definition you have noticed an action, so why the two features?). The justification for using these specific 'features' in the model was simple: it got the model to work. But if we want a transition theory of how a human learner gets information from the environment to learn past tenses, we need a principled explanation, not just a kluge. Nowhere in the emergentist literature does there seem to be a principled basis for determining what could and could not be a cue (Gibson, 1992) . But of course, if anything could be a cue, the concept of 'cue' is totally vacuous, hence totally useless.
VIII Conclusions: the explanatory burden of an emergentist account
Consider again the basic emergentist position. In Ellis's words (1998: 27): Emergentists believe that the complexity of language emerges from relatively simple developmental processes being exposed to a massive and complex environment. Thus, they substitute a process description for a state description, study development rather than the final state and focus on the language acquisition process rather than the language acquisition device.
Consider what this actually means:
To use a fairly simple example, linguists of all stripes recognize the concept SUBJECT, and assume that it enters into various causal relations that determine various outcomes in various languages: the form of relative clauses in English, the assignment of reference in Japanese anaphoric sentences, agreement markers on verbs, the existence of expletives in some languages, the form of the verb in others, the possibility of certain null arguments in still others and so on. An emergentist like Ellis is apparently prepared to accept this description, but claims, however, that concepts like SUBJECT emerge rather than being given as part of the speaker's innate linguistic endowment. This emergence is the effect of environmental influences; influences, moreover, that act by forming associations in the speaker's mind such that the speaker comes to have the relevant concepts as specified by the linguist's description; here, SUBJECT.
The combination of these two positions imposes a heavy explanatory burden on emergentism. For starters, and still restricting ourselves to the one concept, SUBJECT, the emergentist has to show how the environment could provide the necessary information, in all languages, for all learners to acquire the concept. This means showing what sort of environmental information could be instructive in the right ways, and how this information acts associatively. Frankly, I do not think the emergentist has the ghost of a chance of showing this, but what I think hardly matters. The point is that so far as I can tell, no emergentist has tried. Please note that connectionist simulations, even if they were successful in generalizing beyond their training sets, are beside the point here. It is not enough to show that a connectionist model could learn such and such: In order to underwrite an emergentist claim about language learning, it has to be shown that the model uses information analogous to information that is to be found in the actual environment of a human learner. Emergentists have been slow, to say the least, to meet this challenge.
Of course, it is open to the emergentist to reject linguistics and all its works. That is to say, rather than accepting the concepts posited by most linguists while claiming that the concepts are acquired through associative learning, one could deny that the constructs of linguistic theory are 'psychologically real', hence that they have any causal powers. Ellis sometimes seems to lean towards this position, as when he equates language acquisition with construction learning, and rules with frequency effects. This strategy, however, is fraught with danger. It, too, puts an enormous explanatory burden on the emergentist: to provide a property theory of linguistic competence that can rival so-called Classical kinds of theory, for instance those offered by mad dog nativists. And that burden shows no signs of being borne by any emergentist, although handwaving there is in abundance.
10 As John Tienson, a connectionist advocate, says, quite simply, 'Classical cognitive science says that cognition is rule governed symbol manipulation. Connectionism has nothing as yet to offer in place of this slogan.' And again, 'it is unclear whether connectionism can provide a new conception of the nature of mind and mental activity, and if it can, what that conception would be' (1991: 2; emphasis in original). What goes for connectionism in particular goes for associationism in general. And what goes for cognition in general goes for linguistic competence in particular.
But if the choice is not between two rival theories of linguistic competence, but rather between a theory of linguistic competence and nothing, there is simply no contest. Giving up a moderately successful theory merely in the hope that something better will come along is simply not an option any rational scientist would choose. So it would seem that the emergentist would be well advised to accept, tentatively at least, some sort of classical property theory of linguistic competence, while trying to attack the modularity and innateness of that competence and to demonstrate the possibility of general associative learning mechanisms.
But this, too, will be an uphill struggle. In so far as the best explanation of linguistic competence seems to require concepts like SUBJECT or C-COMMAND, concepts that have no analogues in other domains, it is not possible to reject the claim of modularity; and insofar as the Poverty of the Stimulus argument cannot be overcome by showing how the environment can give us such concepts, the claim of innate ideas is inescapable. Mind you, I think it is all to the good that mad dog nativist claims of modularity and innateness be challenged; theories benefit from competition. It is just that the emergentist challenge to mad dog nativism has hardly been articulated yet, let alone implemented in a coherent research program. Whether that articulation and implementation can be achieved remains to be seen. In the meantime, I would put my money on the mad dogs. 10 This was precisely the point made by Eubank and Gregg (1995) , in the passage that Ellis (inter, Lord knows, alia) so badly misreads (see footnote 5 above): 'A language acquisition theory must explain the acquisition of linguistic competence, . . . and that competence is defined by the theory. For acquisition researchers working within the UG framework, there is a rich, well-developed theory of linguistic competence at hand -not complete, of course, not yet correct in all or even most of its details and perhaps not even in some of its fundamentals, but a theory with one enormous strong point: It is the only one there is' (p. 51; emphasis in original). In the eight years since that was published, the set of rich, welldeveloped theories of linguistic competence has not noticeably burgeoned.
